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Abstract
We propose a simple to implement panel data method to evaluate the impacts of
social policy. The basic idea is to exploit the dependence among cross-sectional units
to construct the counterfactuals. The cross-sectional correlations are attributed to the
presence of some (unobserved) common factors. However, instead of trying to estimate
the unobserved factors, we propose to use observed data. We use a panel of 24 countries
to evaluate the impact of political and economic integration of Hong Kong (HK) with
Mainland China. We find that the political integration hardly had any impact on the
growth of the Hong Kong economy. However, the economic integration has raised HK’s
annual real GDP by about 4%.
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1. Introduction
This paper proposes a panel data methodology to measure the impact of political and
economic integration of Hong Kong with China. One of the difficulties of using nonexper-
imental data to measure the economic impact of a policy intervention is not being able
to simultaneously observe the outcomes of an entity under the intervention and not under
the intervention (e.g. Heckman and Hotz (1989), Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)). Panel
data with observations for a number of individuals over time will often contain information
on some individuals that are subject to policy intervention and some that are not. If the
reactions of individuals towards policy changes are similar (e.g. Hsiao (2003), Hsiao and
Tahmiscioglu (1997)) or even if their responses are different, as long as they are driven by
some common factors (e.g. Gregory and Head (1999), Sargent and Sims (1977)), infor-
mation on other individuals not subject to policy intervention can help to construct the
counterfactuals of those who are subject to policy changes.
Hong Kong was a fishing village ceded to Britain after the opium war in 1842. Many
Mainland Chinese migrated to Hong Kong after the establishment of the People’s Republic
of China in 1949. The population at 1950 was about 2.6 million. In the 1960’s and 1970’s
Hong Kong experienced rapid economic growth and is now considered one of the four “little
dragons” in East Asia. In 1961, its per capita income was US$410, about 13.8 percent
of that of the United States. By the eve of reverting sovereignty back to China on July
1, 1997, Hong Kong’s population was 6.5 million with per capita income of US$21,441,
which was 67.2 percent of that of the U.S.1 The Hang Seng stock market index was at
15,196. Because Hong Kong had been growing rapidly prior to the reversion of sovereignty
to China, many questions have been raised about the impacts of the change of sovereignty
on the growth of the Hong Kong economy (e.g. Sung and Wong (2000)). As a matter of
fact, on the eve of Hong Kong’s signing of the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement
(CEPA) with Mainland China in June 2003, the growth rate for the second quarter of 2003
1Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department web site, URL:http://www.censtad.gov.hk
1
was -.67 percent. The per capita income was US$22,673 in 2003. The Hang Seng Index
fell to 8717 in April 2003.
The CEPA aimed to strengthen the linkage between Mainland China and Hong Kong
by liberalizing trade in services, enhancing cooperation in the area of finance, promot-
ing trade and investment facilitation and mutual recognition of professional qualifications.
The implementation of CEPA started on January 1, 2004 when 273 types of Hong Kong
products could be exported to the Mainland tariff free, another 713 types were added on
January 1, 2005, 261 on January 1, 2006, and a further 37 on January 2007. Chinese citi-
zens residing in selected cities were also allowed to visit Hong Kong as individual tourists,
from 4 cities in 2003 to 49 cities in 2007, including all 21 cities in Guangdong province.
In this paper we try to assess the impact of the political and economic integration of
Hong Kong with Mainland China on Hong Kong’s economy by comparing what actually
happened to Hong Kong’s real GDP growth rates with what would have happened if there
had been no change of sovereignty in July 1997 or no CEPA with Mainland China in 2003.
More specifically, we wish to analyze how these events have changed the growth rate of
Hong Kong. However, to answer this question through conventional econometric modelling
is not easy. We need to know how and why the Hong Kong economy has grown over time
and how the China factor plays a role in Hong Kong’s investment, labor migration and
Hong Kong as an entrepot between China and the rest of the world, etc. Most of the growth
literature is highly abstract. Empirical analysis based on the theoretical literature would
often require the imposition, as Sims (1980) claimed, of “incredible” a priori identifying
restrictions. Data demand will also be huge. Moreover, often when external conditions
change, people’s optimal decision rules also change. There simply may not be enough
post-change observations to provide reliable inferences for the post-change outcomes. In
addition, Hong Kong’s economy has also been subject to many external shocks after the
reversion of sovereignty. The Asian financial crisis broke out in October, 1997. The Thai
Baht/US dollar exchange rate was 27 in June, 1997. It fell to 35.8 in September, 1997
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and further, to 44.4 Baht to U.S.$1 in December. The crisis in Thailand quickly spread
to S. Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and other Pacific Rim
countries with varying degrees of severity. Hong Kong was hit by international speculative
attacks on four occasions in 1998. H5N1 Avian flu also broke out in December 1997
that caused 5 deaths and led to the slaughtering of more than a million chickens. By
December 1997, the Hang Seng index had fallen to the 10722. In March 2003 Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) spread to Hong Kong from China.2
If we know the outcomes of a subject under intervention and not under intervention,
the effect of a policy intervention is just the difference between the outcomes under inter-
vention and in the absence of intervention. However, we rarely simultaneously observe the
outcomes of an individual under intervention or in the absence of intervention. To properly
evaluate the effect of a policy intervention on a subject or unit we need to construct the
counterfactuals of the missing outcomes. Our approach to constructing the counterfactuals
of the individual subject to intervention, say the ith unit, is to use other units that are
not subject to intervention to predict what would have happened to the ith unit had it
not been subject to policy intervention. The basic idea behind this approach is to rely on
the correlations among cross-sectional units. We attribute the cross-sectional dependence
to the presence of common factors that drive all the relevant cross-sectional units. In
section 2 we set up the basic model. Section 3 proposes a panel approach to construct the
counterfactuals without the need to identify the underlying model. Section 4 discusses a
procedure to evaluate the time-varying treatment effects of a social program. Section 5
discusses strategies for selecting the most relevant cross-sectional units to construct coun-
terfactuals. Section 6 discusses the data sources. Empirical results are presented in section
7. Conclusions are in section 8.
2. The Basic Model
The basic approach for constructing the counterfactuals is to rely on the correlations
2For more information, see Jao (2001).
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among cross-sectional units. We assume the correlations among cross-sectional units are
due to some common factors that drive all cross-sectional units, although their impacts on
each cross-sectional unit may be different. Let y0it denote the outcome of the ith unit at
time t without policy intervention. As in Forni and Reichlin (1998), Gregory and Head















the 1×K vector of constants that may vary across i, αi denotes the fixed individual-specific
effects, εit denotes the ith unit random idiosyncratic component with E(εit) = 0.
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Assumption 4: rank (B) = K.
Remark 2.1: Model (2.1) assumes that the individual outcome is the sum of two compo-




cross-sectional units and an idiosyncratic component consists of a function of individual
specific effects αi and a random component εit. We assume the idiosyncratic components
are uncorrelated across individuals.3 The correlation across individuals are caused by the
3As pointed out by a referee that the assumption about the idiosyncratic components being
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Remark 2.2: We made no assumption about the time series properties of f
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t
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Remark 2.3: Assumption 4 implies that the number of observable cross-sectional units,
N , is greater than the number of common time-varying factors, f
˜
t
. The assumption is
reasonable since it has been shown empirically by Sargent and Sims (1977), Giannone,
Reichlin and Sala (2005) (see also Watson’s discussion of that paper in the same volume),
Stock and Watson (2005) and Onatski (2009) that only a few common factors explain the
bulk of the variance of macroeconomic data.
3. A Panel Approach to Construct Counterfactuals
Let y1it denote the outcome of the ith unit at time t under treatment or intervention
and y0it denote the outcome of the ith unit in the absence of treatment or intervention at
time t. Then the treatment effect for the ith unit at time t is
∆it = y
1
it − y0it. (3.1)
However, often we do not simultaneously observe y0it and y
1
it. The observed data, yit, are
in the form that
yit = dity
1










as to whether a factor is strong or weak could be useful (e.g. Chudik, Pesaran and Tosetti
(2010)), in practice, it is difficult to know if the extracted factors are strong or weak (or
somewhere in between). Therefore, in this paper, we make the simplified assumption that




and the random idiosyncratic component for the ith unit, εit, merely represents the
impacts of ith unit-specific factors. In other words, we assume the factors that create the








= (y1t, . . . , yNt)
′ be an N × 1 vector of yit at time t. Suppose there is no
intervention before T1, then the observed y
˜
t








, for t = 1, . . . , T1. (3.4)
Suppose at time T1+1, there is a policy change for the ith unit. Without loss of generality,
let this be the first unit that receives the treatment at time T1 + 1 and onwards,
y1t = y
1
1t for t = T1 + 1, . . . , T. (3.5)
We assume other units are not affected by the policy intervention at the first unit, then
yit = y
0
it for i = 2, . . . , N, for t = 1, . . . , T. (3.6)
We assume,
Assumption 5: E(εjs | dit) = 0, for j 6= i.
A5 makes no claim about the relationship between dit and εit. They can be correlated.
If so, the observed data are subject to selection on unobservables (e.g. Heckman and
Vytlacil (2001)). They can be independent, then the observed data satisfy the conditional
independence assumption of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). All we need for our approach
is that the jth unit’s idiosyncratic components are independent of dit for j 6= i.
Under A1 - A5, we may predict y01t by ŷ
0












. If both N and T are large, we may use the procedure of Bai and
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be a vector lying in the null space of B, N(B). We normalize the first element
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˜




∈ N(B). Since the minimum variance
predictor depends on the choice of a
˜
and covariance structure of ε
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is a T1 × 1 vector of 1’s, Y is a T1 × (N − 1) matrix of T1




), and A is a T1 × T1 positive definite matrix.
Assumption 6: For fixed K and N , there exists an a
˜
























has a unique minimum.
Lemma 1: Under A1 - A6, the solution of (3.13), (ˆ̄α, ˆ̃a
˜
∗
) converges to a (ᾱ, ã
˜
∗) that
corresponds to an a
˜
∈ N(B) as T1 −→ ∞.
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) = 0. Therefore, the
minimum distance regression of y1t on a constant and ỹ
˜
t





) when T1 → ∞. (e.g. Amemiya (1985)).
Remark 3.1: The null vectors in N(B) are not unique. However, for given A or objec-
tive function (3.13), the solution is unique. When A = I, our objective is to obtain the
minimum variance predictor of y01t given ỹ
˜
t
. In other words, as pointed out by a referee,
the conditional paths for the units under treatment are computed by exploiting only con-
temporaneous cross-sectional correlations. To allow the exploitation at leads and lags of
the dynamic relationships among cross-sectional units, we may let A in (3.13) be a nondi-





1i, . . . , ε
∗
1t)
′, and use the
optimal forecasting formula of Goldberger (1962) to produce a counterfactual path that
uses both current and lagged values of y
˜
t
. However, the so generated lead-lag relationships
is restricted by the serial correlation patterns of ε
˜
∗
1 as compared to an unrestricted vector
autoregressive model (VAR).




depends on the choice of a
˜
, it is just an unknown
finite constant under A1 in the regression model (3.13). Therefore it can be treated as an
unknown in (3.13).
When A = I, Lemma 1 suggests that we can predict y01t by








Therefore, we may predict ∆1t using
∆̂1t = y1t − ŷ01t for t = T1 + 1, . . . , T. (3.16)
Lemma 2: Under A1-A6,
E(∆̂1t | Y, ỹ
˜
t
) = ∆1t, t = T1 + 1, . . . , T, (3.17)
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and
Var (∆̂1t) = Var (ε
∗































Lemma 2 follows from (3.9) and (3.12)
Remark 3.3: The counterfactuals y01t, t = T1 +1, . . . , T depend on the individual specific
effects α1, the common factors, f
˜
t






1, and the idiosyncratic component ε1t. However, the counterfactual predictor







is embedded in ỹ
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B, which may be difficult in finite sample.
Remark 3.4: We do not make any assumption about εis and dit. All we need is that the
policy intervention on the ith unit has no bearing on εjt for j 6= i (Assumption 5). Hence,
if the process (2.2) satisfies Assumptions 1-5, our proposed approach allows us to bypass
the selection issue that has been a central concern in the program evaluation literature
(e.g. Heckman and Hotz (1989), Heckman and Vytlacil (2001)).






















, t = 1, . . . , T1, (3.19)
and construct the treatment effect had the policy intervention was in place before T1, ∆̂1t =




are estimated using data from T1 + 1, . . . , T .
Remark 3.6: The synthetic control method for comparative case studies also use infor-
mation of other individuals to construct the counterfactuals of treated individuals (e.g.
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Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Card and Krueger (1994)). However, the focus and the
approach are different. The synthetic approach assumes that (e.g. Abadie, Diamond and
Hainmueller (2010))











t + εit, for i = 2, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , T1, T1 + 1, . . . , T, (3.20)
while for the first unit, they assume y1t follows (3.20) for t = 1, . . . , T1, and for t =
T1 + 1, . . . , T , y1t equals











t + ε1t for t = T1 + 1, . . . , T, (3.21)
where δt is an unknown common factor with constant factor loading across units, z
˜
i is an
(r × 1) vector of observed covariates (not affected by the intervention), θ
˜
t is an (r × 1)
vector of unknown parameters, λ
˜
t is a (K × 1) vector of unobserved common factors, µ
˜
i
is a (K × 1) vector of unknown factor loading and ∆1t is the treatment effect for the first
unit. If we let αi = 0, b
′

















t) in (2.1), model (3.20) can be
put in the form of (2.1). However, for (3.7) to hold, we need a
˜
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ai = 1, where x
˜
1 is an
(r + M) × 1 column vector consisting of the r observed covariates z
˜
1 for the control
(pre-treatment) period. To ensure unbiasedness of their estimator, under the assumption
that the dimension of unknown common factors is K, they suggest including M other
covariates in x
˜





km1sy1s, m = 1, . . . ,M . X is an (r+M)× (N − 1) matrix, a collection of all other













, then ȳmj is just a simple pre-control time average). Therefore, the cross-
sectional units weight ai will be sensitive to the prior choice of z
˜
, M , and kjs, hence the
predicted ŷ01t, or ∆̂1t. Nor is the probability distribution of ŷ
0
1t or ∆̂1t easily derivable. On
the other hand, we suggest using regression method to choose ã
˜
to mimic the behavior of
treated individuals before the intervention as close as possible, say, by minimizing (3.13).
As long as N is fixed, our procedure yields a unique weight ã
˜
and unique ŷ01t, hence unique
∆̂1t with known probability distribution. Neither do we need to impose the constraint




aj = 1. Our approach can also easily be adapted to accommodate the case
that some exogenous variables z
˜
t also drive y
˜
t
by treating (2.2) conditional on z
˜
t.
Remark 3.7: An alternative approach to exploit the correlation among the cross-sectional
units is to construct a vector autoregressive model (VAR). A VAR can describe dynamic





















Pre-intervention data can then be used to estimate the parameters of the system (3.23),
θ
˜
pre-int = vec (c
˜
, A1, . . . , Ap)pre-int, θ̂
˜
pre-int. The expected path of a cross-sectional unit
in the absence of intervention, say y01t, can then be constructed based on θ̂
˜
pre-int. This
approach has been adopted recently by Giannone, Lenza and Reichlin (2010) to evaluate
the effect of policy intervention in the euro area. However, if there is a feedback relation
from y01,t−j to (y
0
2t, . . . , y
0
Nt) (i.e. the elements of the first column of Aj are nonzero (e.g.
Granger (1969), Hsiao (1982))), substituting y1t in lieu of y
0
1t in system (3.23) is likely to





if y1,t−j = y
1
1,t−j, then (y2t, . . . , yNt) cannot be (y
0
2t, . . . , y
0
Nt).













can be transformed into a VAR model (3.23). If the number of factors, K, is less than N ,






(i.e. with all the elements of the first column of Aj equal to zero except for the first element








′, j = 1, . . . , p, then
y01t will be just equal to (3.7).










) = Var (ε1t) is smaller than
(3.12). If N and T are large, one can use Bai (2003), Bai and Ng (2002) procedure to





. However, if T is small,





. It may be










as demonstrated in our Monte Carlo studies in
section 5 (also see Pesaran, Smith and Smith (2007)).
4. Tests for Significance of Policy Intervention
The predictor for the effectiveness of social policy (3.16) allows the effects of such a
policy to vary over time. From the estimated ∆1t, we may use time series techniques to
evaluate the evolution of policy effects over time.
Assumption 7: {εit} is weakly dependent (mixing) for all i.
Suppose the treatment effects, ∆1t, follow an autoregressive - moving average model
(ARMA) of the form,
a(L)∆1t = µ+ θ(L)ηt, (4.1)
where L is the lag operator, ηt is an i.i.d. process with zero mean and constant variance
and the roots of θ(L) = 0 lie outside the unit circle. If the roots of a(L) = 0 all lie outside
the unit circle, the treatment effect is stationary, and the long-term treatment effect is
∆1 = a(L)
−1µ = µ∗. (4.2)
If one of the roots of a(L) = 0 lies on the unit circle, the intervention effects are integrated
of order 1, I(1).
From the estimated ∆̂1t, we can use the Box-Jenkins (1970) procedure to construct a
time series model,
ã(L)∆̂1t = µ̃+ θ̃(L)vt, (4.3)
12
where vt is i.i.d. with mean zero and variance σ
2
v.
Lemma 3: Suppose the roots of a(L) = 0 lie outside the unit circle, under A1 - A6, when
both T1 and (T − T1) go to infinity,
plim ã(L)−1µ̃ = plim µ̂∗ = µ∗ = a(L)−1µ (4.4)
and
√






































Phillips and Durlauf (1986)). Either way,
y01t − ŷ01t = ε∗1t +O(T−
1
2 ). (4.7)
Adding and subtracting yields
∆̂1t = y1t − ŷ01t = ∆1t + ε∗1t + o(1). (4.8)
Substituting (4.8) into (4.1) yields
a(L)∆̂1t = µ+ θ(L)ηt + a(L)ε
∗
1t + o(1). (4.9)
Since ε∗1t is a mean zero I(0) process, we obtain (4.2) by approximating θ(L)ηt + a(L)ε
∗
1t
by a q-th order moving average process, θ∗(L)vt. If the roots of θ
∗(L) all lie outside the
unit circle, ∆̂1t can also be approximated by an AR process,
ã(L)∆̂1t = µ̃+ vt, (4.10)
13
where ã(L) = θ∗(L)−1a(L) and µ̃ = θ∗(L)−1µ.
Under fairly general conditions, the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) of a(L), θ∗(L)
and µ are consistent and asymptotically normally distributed. The asymptotic variance,
σ2µ∗ , can then be derived by using the delta method (e.g. Rao (1973, ch. 2)).
If the treatment effects is a stationary process (i.e. the roots of a(L) = 0 all lie outside
the unit circle), the long-term impact of the intervention can also be estimated by taking
the simple average of the treatment effects.
Lemma 4: Suppose all the roots of a(L) = 0 lie outside the unit circle, under A1 - A6,







(T − T1) → ∞
(4.11)
The variance of (4.11) can be approximated by the heteroscedastic-autocorrelation consis-
tent (HAC) estimator of Newey and West (1987).
Proof: Given (3.17) and (3.18), the law of large number holds.
5. Choice of Cross-Sectional Units
5.1 Modeling Strategy
Often there are large number of cross-sectional units that can be used to predict y01t
(or that are generated according to (2.1) or (2.2)). Intuitively, it would appear to favor
using as many available cross-sectional units as possible as long as T > N . This will be the




However, if T1 or
N
T1
is finite, there may be an advantage to use only a subset of available
cross-sectional units to predict the counterfactuals, in particular, if the data generating
processes for cross-sectional units satisfy the condition of Lemma 5 (ii) below.
Let there be m cross-sectional units that optimally predict y01t and (N − m − 1)
remaining cross-sectional units that could also be included to predict y01t. Let Y1 and Y2
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be the T1 ×m and T1 × (N −m − 1) time series observations for these m cross-sectional
unit and (N −m− 1) cross-sectional units, respectively, then
Y1 = FB
′




2 + E2, (5.2)




) and the ith column of B′1 and B
′
2 take




′, and E1 and E2 denote the T1 × m and T1 × (N −m − 1) idiosyncratic
components of Y1 and Y2, respectively.
Lemma 5:Under A1 - A5,





















Y1), where Θ1 = E(E ′1E1).
For proof, see Appendix A.















2 that will converge to 0
˜
under the condition of Lemma 5 (ii). In
other words, one can use all (N−1) available cross-sectional units to predict y01t. However,
in many occasions, T1 is finite. As more cross-sectional units are used, the variance of ã
˜
∗
will also increase. To balance the within-sample fit with post-sample prediction error, we
suggest the following model selection strategy (Hsiao and Wan (2009)):
Step 1: Use R2 or likelihood values to select the best predictor for y01t using j cross-
sectional units out of (N − 1) cross-sectional units, denoted by M(j)∗, for j =
1, . . . , N − 1.4
4Given N , there are 2N possible combinations. Step 1 is proposed to reduce the number
of predictive models. An alternative is to use some “boosting method (Buhlmann (2006))”
or “LASSO (Tibshirani (1996))” or to use some targeted predictors based on some soft
and hard-thresholding as suggested by a referee.
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Step 2: From M(1)∗,M(2)∗, . . . ,M(N − 1)∗, choose M(m)∗ in terms of some model se-
lection criterion.
5.2 Monte Carlo Studies
Under the assumption that y
˜
t
is generated by a factor model of the form (2.2), in this
sub-section we compare the predictive performance of our approach versus the approach
of first determining the number of factors, K, and identifying α1 and b
˜




, α1, and b
˜
1 to generate the counterfactuals when N and T are small.
First, we wish to see if there is a need to use all cross-sectional units using our
approach. There are a number of model selection criteria one can use to select the best
approximating model. In this section we conduct a small scale Monte Carlo to examine
the performance of Akaike information criterion (AIC) (Akaike (1973, 1974)), and AICC








(y01t − ŷ01t(p))2, (5.3)
where ŷ01t(p) is generated by using p cross-sectional units data of yit for t = 1, . . . , T1 to









p Yt, t = T1 + 1, . . . , T .
To see which model selection criterion works better, we generate model (2.1) with N
= 21 countries, the sum of the dimension of both Y1 and Y2. We use T1 = 25, 40, and 60
observations, the number of pre-intervention periods to approximate the path of y1 before
intervention. The OLS estimators are then used to predict y01t for the post-intervention
period which has T − T1 = 10 periods. Four different factor structures are used. The first
one consists of two (K = 2) stationary factors:
f1t = 0.3f1,t−1 + u1t
f2t = 0.6f2,t−1 + u2t
(5.4)
where the innovation for factor loadings ut and the idiosyncratic errors εt are generated
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by N(0, 1) and σN(0, 1), respectively. The second one is another set of stationary factors:
f1t = 0.8f1,t−1 + u1t
f2t = −0.6f2,t−1 + u2t + 0.8u2t−1
f3t = u3t + 0.9u3t−1 + 0.4u3t−2.
(5.5)
The third has an i.i.d. factor. The last one has an almost non-stationary factor:
f1t = 0.95f1,t−1 + u1t. (5.6)
In all the above cases, b
˜
i ∼ N(1, 1).











+ 2(p+ 2) (5.7)
AICC(p) = AIC(p) +
2(p+ 2)(p+ 3)
T1 − (p+ 1)− 2
(5.8)
where p is the number of countries included; e
˜
0 denote the OLS residuals.
We repeat the experiment for each of the four data generating process five-hundred
times. All four simulation results show that the pre-intervention MSE decreases when p
increases, whereas post-intervention MSE decreases initially and then increases when p in-
creases. Denote the optimal number of countries chosen as m. The results are summarized
in Tables 1-4. For all the experiments, the average m is between K and N − 1. This is
consistent with the notion of the bias and variance tradeoff. The frequency distributions
show that not once all 20 cross-sectional units are selected in terms of AICC and around
1% chance the 20 units models are chosen in terms of AIC. On average, between 4 and
6 cross-sectional units are chosen in terms of AICC and 6 to 12 cross-sectional units are
chosen in terms of AIC. When T1 is small, say 25 or 40, the PMSE in terms of models cho-
sen by AICC and AIC are significantly smaller than the models using all 20 cross-sectional
units. When T1 becomes large, say 60, models using all 20 cross-sectional units have PMSE
converge towards the PMSE of the optimally chosen models in terms of AICC or AIC, but
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the PMSE based on 20 cross-sectional units are still larger than those based only on m
cross-sectional units. These Monte Carlo studies appear to support the theoretical finding
that optimal m is between K and (N −1) when T1 is finite. When NT1 −→ 0, then using all
available cross-sectional units will be fine because the estimated â
˜
2 will converge to zero.
We then compare the predictive performance of our approach based on AIC, and AICC
with Bai and Ng (2002) PC and IC criteria. Tables 5 and Table 6 provide the results of
one factor model based on setting maximum number of K equal to 8 and 20, respectively.
As one can see the predictive performance of Bai and Ng (2002) is very sensitive to the
prior specified number of maximum K. The performance of factor model also deteriorates
when the number of factors increased from 1 to 5 (Tables 6 and 7); when the average
of b
˜
i changed from 0 to 0.3 or 1 (Tables 9 and 10); when the distribution of b
˜
i changed
to Uniform (−1, 1) or N(2, 2) (Table 8 and 11); when the idiosyncratic components, εit,
have heteroscedastic variances or serially correlated (Table 12 and 13) and signal-to-noise
ratio reduces (Table 15). However, the performance of factor model does improve when T
increases (Table 14).
In short, when N and T are finite, the limited Monte Carlos show that generating
counterfactuals based on a factor model using Bai and Ng (2002) model selection strategy
appears to be sensitive to (a) the signal-to-noise ratio; (b) the distribution of factor loading








i; (d) the number of unknown factors, K;
(e) the a priori assumed maximum number of unknown factors; (f) the serial correlations
of the idiosyncratic components, εit; and (g) the heteroscedasticity of εit. On the other
hand, our procedure of using ỹ
˜
it
in lieu of f
˜
t
does not appear to be affected by any of these
issues. On average, they yield much smaller prediction errors than the factor approach.
6. Data
Because Hong Kong, by comparison, is a tiny city relative to other countries and
regions, we believe whatever happened in Hong Kong will have no bearing to other coun-
tries. In other words, we expect Assumption 5 to hold. Therefore, we use quarterly real
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growth rate of Australia, Austria, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Philippines, Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, UK, and US to predict the quar-
terly real growth rate of Hong Kong in the absence of intervention. All the nominal GDP,
CPI are from OECD Statistics, International Financial Statistics and CEIC Data base.
There are many ways to compute quarterly growth rates. One can either measure the
change compared with the corresponding quarter in the previous year (year-on-year) or
measure the change since the previous quarter (e.g. Neo (2003)). We note that the four
quarters within one year have different numbers of working days and different countries
have different seasonal effects on production and expenditure. For instance, Chinese new
year always falls in the first quarter and it is a big holiday for Hong Kong, virtually all
business and government agencies are closed for celebration, but not so for other countries.
Since our data are non-seasonally adjusted and our interest is in finding the long term
trend, we compute the quarterly growth rate by measuring the change compared with the
corresponding quarter in the previous year.
7. Empirical Analysis
In this section we illustrate the use of our panel data approach for program evalua-
tion by considering the impact on Hong Kong real GDP growth rate with the revert of
sovereignty on July 1, 1997 from U.K. to China and the implementation of CEPA starting
in 2004-Q1 between the Mainland China and Hong Kong. (We present the evaluation
using the factor approach in Appendix B.) We first wish to evaluate the impact of change
of sovereignty on real GDP had Hong Kong stayed under British rule. Since there are only
18 observations between 1993Q1 and 1997Q2, we limit the countries under consideration
for constructing counterfactuals to China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and US — countries that are either in the region or econom-
ically closely associated with Hong Kong. Using AICC, we select Japan, Korea, US and
Taiwan to construct the hypothetical growth path of Hong Kong had there been no change
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of sovereignty. The OLS weights based on 1993Q1 - 1997Q2 data are reported in Table 16
and the estimated treatment effects are reported in Table 17. The actual and hypothetical
growth paths for the period 1993Q1 - 1997Q2, and 1997Q3 - 2003Q4 are plotted in Figure
1 and 2, respectively. Because the treatment effects appears to be serially correlated (see
figure 3), we fit an AR(2) model for the estimated treatment effects:
∆̂1t = −.0063 + 1.459 ∆̂1,t−1− .6547 ∆̂1,t−2 + η̂t
(.0068) (0.1559) (.1558)
(6.1)
where estimated standard errors are in parentheses. The implied long-run effects is -.032.
However, the t-statistic is only -1.04, not statistically significant.
Using the AIC criterion, the selected countries are Japan, Korea, Philippines, Taiwan
and the US. The OLS estimates of the weights are in Table 18 and treatment effects are
in Table 19, respectively. The actual and hypothetical growth paths for 1993Q1 - 1997Q2
and 1997Q3 - 2003Q4 are plotted in Figures 4 and 5, respectively. Again, the estimated
treatment effects appear serially correlated. The fitted AR(2) model takes the form
∆̂1t = −.0066 + 1.3821 ∆̂1,t−1− 0.5764 ∆̂1,t−2 + η̂t
(.0078) (.1722) (.1722)
(6.2)
The implied long-run effect is -0.033. However, the t-statistic is only -.94, which is not
statistically significant.
The real GDP growth in Hong Kong appears to be approximated well by the chosen
controls before treatment by either criterion. The estimated treatment effects are not
statistically significant. Therefore, we may conclude that the political integration of Hong
Kong with Mainland China do not appear to have any significant impact on Hong Kong’s
economic growth. The lack of intervention effects is hardly surprising given the “one
country, two systems” concept proposed by Deng Xiaoping. It is generally recognized that
apart from change of national flags, Hong Kong’s institutional arrangements were basically
left untouched during this period. Moreover, the change of sovereignty was known fourteen
years in advance and the institutional arrangements were laid down in great detail in the
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Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984. Presumably, all needed adjustments had already
taken place before 1997.
Given we do not find any effect of the change of sovereignty, we can pool the data of
1993Q1 to 2003Q4 to examine the effect of the CEPA including Individual Travel Scheme
and Removal of Preferential Tariff which was signed on June 29, 2003, but implementation
only started on January 1, 2004. Since we now have more degrees of freedom, we can use
the model selection strategy discussed in section 5 to generate the hypothetic growth path
for Hong Kong had there been no CEPA with Mainland China. Using the AICC criterion,
the countries selected are Austria, Italy, Korea, Mexico, Norway and Singapore. OLS
estimates of the weights are reported in Table 20. Actual and predicted growth path from
1993Q1 to 2003Q4 are plotted in Figure 7. The availability of more pre-intervention period
data appears to allow more accurate estimates of the country weights and better tracing
of the pre-intervention path. The estimated quarterly treatment effects are reported in
Table 21. The actual and predicted counterfactuals for the period 2004Q1 to 2008Q1
are presented in Figure 8. Using the AIC criterion, the selected group consists of Austria,
Germany, Italy, Korea, Mexico, Norway, Philippines, Singapore and Switzerland. The OLS
estimates of the weights are in Table 22 and the estimated quarterly treatment effects are
in Table 23. The pre- and post intervention actual and predicted outcomes are plotted
in Figures 10 and 11. It is notable that both groups of countries trace closely the actual
Hong Kong path before the implementation of CEPA (with R2 above .93). It is also quite
remarkable that the post-sample predictions closely matched the actual turning points at
a lower level for the treatment period even though no Hong Kong data were used. The
CEPA effect at each quarter was all positive and appeared to be serially uncorrelated, see
Figures 9 and 12. The average actual growth rate from 2004Q1 - 2008Q1 is 7.26%. The
average projected growth rate without CEPA is 3.23% using the group of countries selected
by AICC and 3.47% using the group selected by AIC. The estimated average treatment
effect is 4.03% with a standard error of 0.016 based on the AICC group and 3.79% with a
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standard error of 0.0151 based on the AIC group. The t-statistic is 2.5134 for the former
group and 2.5122 for the latter group. Either set of countries yields similar predictions
and highly significant CEPA effects. In other words, through liberalization and increased
openness with Mainland China, the real GDP growth rate of Hong Kong is raised by more
than 4% compared to the growth rate had there been no CEPA agreement with Mainland
China.
The Hong Kong government statistics appear to corroborate this finding. A recent
Hong Kong Legislative Council paper (LC Paper No. CD(1) 1849/06-07(04)) shows that
the tariff-free access of goods produced in Hong Kong has stimulated rising capital invest-
ment from HK$103 million in 2005, to HK$202 million in 2006 and HK$239 million in
2007. Liberalization to trade in services has further stimulated capital investment. Capi-
tal investments in transport, logistics, distribution, advertising and construction stood at
HK$1.0 billion in 2004, but were at HK$2.4 billion in 2007. The Individual Visit Scheme
(IVS) has led to a substantial increase of tourism from China. From the implementation
of the scheme to the end of 2006, Mainland Chinese visitors have made 17.2 million trips
to Hong Kong. IVS visitors spending in 2006 was HK$9.3 billion, about 38% higher than
2004. Moreover, the implementation of CEPA also helped to rebuild confidence in the
economy after a prolonged period of economic stagnation. For instance, the value of total
receipts for the restaurant sector in 2008Q1 was up by 15.8% compared with 2007Q1 and
the value of total retail sales in March, 2008 increased by 20% compared with a year earlier.
If the fundamental relations between the aggregate and components stay the same before
and after 2004Q1, then one should expect the relative contribution of additional unit in-
crease of each component to the aggregates should stay the same in those two periods
and the impact of CEPA would be on its impact on the value of each component. How-
ever, a simple sectoral analysis of regressing log(real GDP) on log(Re-Export from China),
log(Import) and log(Number of visitors) also show a statistically significant change of the
impact of log(Number of Chinese Visitors) from 0.0638 in pre-CEPA period to 0.1663 for
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the post-CEPA period with highly significant t-values. In other words, it appears that IVS
is the most important component of CEPA and its impact not just on increasing tourist
revenue, but serves to raise the confidence level of Hong Kong consumers and investors.
As a result, the unemployment rate has dropped from 7.9% in 2003 to 4.8% in 2006 and
4.2% in September-November 2007. The per-capita income in 2006 reached US$27,604.
The Hang Seng Index at the end of 2007 reached 27812.
8. Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a panel data approach to assess the impact of a
policy intervention. We demonstrate that the dependence among cross-sectional units
can be utilized to construct the counterfactuals. We identify the source of cross-sectional
correlations through a factor framework. However, if sample size is finite, there may be
an advantage to just use observed y
˜
t




already embedded in y
˜
t
. In this approach, there is no need to distill the fundamental
factors and their factor loading matrix as in Bai (2003), Bai and Ng (2002), Bernanke and
Boivin (2003)), etc. The method is easy to implement and inference appears quite robust.
We illustrate our methodology by considering the political and economic intervention
effects on Hong Kong’s economy. We find that the change of sovereignty in 1997 hardly
had any impact on Hong Kong’s economy. On the other hand, the implementation of
CEPA agreement in 2004 has a significant impact. Hong Kong’s real GDP growth rate is
4% higher than what would have happened in the absence of CEPA.
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APPENDIX A
In this Appendix, we prove Lemma 6. Using the notation of section 5, decompose
Y = (Y1, Y2). Noting that a
˜





































1], respectively, where b̃
˜
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We first show that if m < K, then MSE(Y ) < MSE(Y1),MSE(Y ) < MSE(Y1) holds iff
























































C = −(B2B′2 +Θ2)−1B2B′1(B1M2B′1 +Θ1)−1B1B′2(B2B′2 +Θ2)−1 − (B2B′2 +Θ2)−1
M2 = IK −B′2(B2B′2 +Θ2)−1B2




2B2 ≡ IK −U ′U , where
U = D−
1




By Theorem A.3.5 (See P.639 of Anderson (2003)), the conditions for IK − U ′U and
IL − UU ′ to be positive definite are the same. Thus,







2 > 0 ⇐⇒ D −B2B′2 = Θ2 > 0.
Since the last statement holds, we conclude that M2 > 0.
P2 ≡ IK −M2 = B′2(B2B′2 +Θ2)−1B2 > 0
Thus, (B1B
′








⇐⇒B2B′1(B1M2B′1 +Θ1)−1B1B′2(B2B′2 +Θ2)−1 + IL > 0
⇐⇒B2B′1(B1M2B′1 +Θ1)−1B1B′2 + (B2B′2 +Θ2) > 0
⇐⇒B2[B′1(B1M2B′1 +Θ1)−1B1 + IK ]B′2 +Θ2 > 0
Therefore, C is a negative definite matrix.








































































where G = B1M2B
′
1 + Θ1 and H = B1B
′
1 + Θ1. To see if RHS > 0, we need to check
G−1 − (GH−1G−G)−1 > 0.
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1 +Θ1) < IK since IK −M2 > 0.
Then, G−1 − (GH−1G−G)−1 > 0
⇐⇒ G−1 > (GH−1G−G)−1 = (H−1G− IK)−1G−1
⇐⇒ IK > (H−1G− IK)−1
which is always true. Therefore, S > 0. By the positivity of Schur Complement, (A.3)
holds. Therefore, m > K.
We now show that given the optimal choice of m cross-sectional units, any additional
cross-sectional units yield no predictive power.
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In this appendix we present the predictions of Hong Kong’s real economic growth rate
had there been no change in sovereignty or no CEPA implementation with Mainland China
using the factor approach. IC1 and IC2 are used to estimate the number of underlying
common factors with maximum number of K equal to 20. Both methods give K = 20,
and therefore same predicted path. Tables B1 and B2 present the estimated treatment
effects of political and economic integration based on Bai and Ng (2002) the IC criterion
of selecting K. Figures B1 - B4 plot the within sample and post-sample predictions under
political and economic integration. As one can see from these figures, both the within
and post-sample predictions are a lot more volatile than using the observed data. The
estimated treatment effects fitting an AR(1) model is 4.63% and is statistically significant
with t-statistic equal to 8.9.
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Table 1.1 Optimal Choice of m and the Average PMSE, 2 Stationary Factors 








 AIC AICC 20 AIC AICC 20 AIC AICC 20 
Avg. # 11.726 4.432 - 11.418 4.468 - 11.39 4.664 - 
Avg. R
2
 0.9291 0.8412 0.9498 0.9436 0.881 0.9597 0.986 0.9699 0.9901 
Avg. PMSE 6.1888 2.3592 7.9999 2.8749 1.2214 3.7846 0.6227 0.2434 0.8875 
T1 = 40 T = 50 
Avg. # 6.872 4.684 - 6.924 4.794 - 7.096 4.73 - 
Avg. R
2
 0.8175 0.7937 0.8531 0.8804 0.8644 0.904 0.9617 0.9563 0.9693 
Avg. PMSE 1.8227 1.67 2.1695 0.9195 0.8492 1.0977 0.1903 0.1737 0.2197 
T1 = 60 T = 70 
Avg. # 6.236 5.098 - 6.266 5.056 - 6.206 5.108 - 
Avg. R
2
 0.7711 0.7607 0.8014 0.8549 0.8484 0.8738 0.9531 0.9516 0.9592 
Avg. PMSE 1.4242 1.3901 1.5422 0.7205 0.7152 0.7781 0.1459 0.1425 0.1587 
 
Table 1.2 Frequency Distribution of Optimal Number of m, 2 Stationary Factors 




















 A B A B A B A B A B A B A B A B A B 
1 1 12 1 14 0 2 5 10 0 4 1 6 3 4 1 5 0 0 
2 4 59 3 55 5 47 13 34 8 36 8 30 14 31 10 23 7 16 
3 9 103 4 89 15 104 23 81 22 82 20 75 28 61 38 64 35 60 
4 17 107 16 112 11 109 44 122 42 110 49 125 59 95 50 105 69 110 
5 14 81 15 96 18 90 72 97 77 113 79 120 88 120 88 112 89 126 
6 17 73 21 65 27 65 82 86 104 73 65 74 96 91 98 95 84 94 
7 28 33 37 42 33 43 77 41 66 41 71 42 86 45 81 56 88 60 
8 25 19 26 19 29 25 62 20 56 29 57 17 56 29 64 24 55 20 
9 34 7 47 3 29 7 46 5 47 10 54 10 34 18 35 10 43 12 
10 37 6 40 3 46 5 28 4 30 0 45 1 15 2 19 5 19 2 
11 36 0 44 2 29 2 20 0 25 1 27 0 10 3 8 1 6 0 
12 45 0 43 0 41 1 17 0 13 1 10 0 9 1 6 0 5 0 
13 46 0 35 0 37 0 6 0 4 0 12 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 
14 39 0 37 0 44 0 2 0 3 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
15 45 0 44 0 38 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 35 0 28 0 39 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 38 0 23 0 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18 18 0 23 0 8 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 10 0 11 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 2 0 2 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A = AIC; B = AICC; 
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Table 2.1 Optimal Choice of m and the Average PMSE, 3 Stationary Factors 








 AIC AICC 20 AIC AICC 20 AIC AICC 20 
Avg. # 11.19 4.438 - 11.696 4.58 - 11.704 4.738 - 
Avg. R
2
 0.9312 0.8601 0.9524 0.9587 0.9137 0.9705 0.9884 0.9737 0.9914 
Avg. PMSE 6.0833 2.3475 8.3017 3.0528 1.243 4.1386 0.6458 0.2469 0.8117 
T1 = 40 T = 50 
Avg. # 6.692 4.614 - 7.01 4.714 - 7.05 4.834 - 
Avg. R
2
 0.8563 0.8368 0.8837 0.917 0.9048 0.933 0.9754 0.9716 0.9801 
Avg. PMSE 1.8804 1.7127 2.2374 0.9663 0.874 1.1342 0.1857 0.1652 0.221 
T1 = 60 T = 70 
Avg. # 6.114 4.922 - 6.172 5.004 - 6.262 5.104 - 
Avg. R
2
 0.8255 0.8183 0.8485 0.8861 0.8809 0.9009 0.9679 0.9668 0.9721 
Avg. PMSE 1.3887 1.3565 1.5384 0.7115 0.6971 0.7841 0.1397 0.1389 0.1552 
 
Table 2.2 Frequency Distribution of Optimal Number of m, 3 Stationary Factors 




















 A B A B A B A B A B A B A B A B A B 
1 2 17 1 10 0 3 4 13 2 4 0 1 1 1 0 3 0 0 
2 5 57 2 49 1 45 9 44 12 31 12 33 15 28 12 23 16 24 
3 5 100 7 104 9 94 29 77 23 88 19 71 40 68 30 69 32 61 
4 15 104 10 97 17 113 68 127 44 118 55 120 67 116 67 107 64 105 
5 28 85 16 101 12 94 70 91 69 111 72 114 93 115 93 118 79 110 
6 24 65 22 65 18 61 75 72 75 72 68 79 73 94 94 88 83 103 
7 24 36 28 34 28 42 71 42 73 48 68 59 88 43 79 54 88 58 
8 31 26 34 20 31 32 58 23 56 21 68 11 48 23 54 22 60 28 
9 43 6 30 13 32 8 38 9 62 6 47 8 38 9 38 14 41 8 
10 43 1 35 6 38 5 31 1 38 1 41 4 22 2 19 2 23 2 
11 40 3 46 0 39 2 26 1 23 0 22 0 10 1 10 0 10 1 
12 43 0 45 1 42 1 12 0 14 0 16 0 3 0 4 0 3 0 
13 30 0 48 0 47 0 6 0 7 0 5 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
14 43 0 36 0 56 0 1 0 1 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
15 35 0 42 0 38 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 32 0 35 0 27 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 31 0 33 0 37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18 17 0 16 0 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 7 0 11 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 2 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A = AIC; B = AICC; 
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Table 3.1 Optimal Choice of m and the Average PMSE, i.i.d. Factor 








 AIC AICC 20 AIC AICC 20 AIC AICC 20 
Avg. # 11.614 4.92 - 11.738 5.03 - 11.904 4.972 - 
Avg. R
2
 0.9389 0.8714 0.9555 0.9657 0.9266 0.9759 0.99 0.9782 0.9929 
Avg. PMSE 5.9299 2.601 8.0873 3.3748 1.3028 4.3716 0.6594 0.2617 0.8572 
T1 = 40 T = 50 
Avg. # 6.174 3.99 - 6.474 4.184 - 6.224 4.05 - 
Avg. R
2
 0.6729 0.6306 0.7402 0.7291 0.6883 0.7835 0.8651 0.8469 0.8932 
Avg. PMSE 1.6635 1.4858 2.0566 0.8903 0.7674 1.0975 0.1696 0.1501 0.2107 
T1 = 60 T = 70 
Avg. # 6.82 5.61 - 7.016 5.744 - 7.19 5.868 - 
Avg. R
2
 0.8182 0.8101 0.8397 0.8919 0.8872 0.9048 0.9752 0.974 0.9781 
Avg. PMSE 1.5597 1.5375 1.6305 0.8022 0.7854 0.8393 0.1590 0.156 0.1655 
 
Table 3.2 Frequency Distribution of Optimal Number of m, i.i.d. Factor 




















 A B A B A B A B A B A B A B A B A B 
1 0 4 1 3 0 0 8 26 8 27 9 21 1 3 0 0 0 0 
2 5 33 1 20 2 21 33 77 23 67 25 72 5 10 4 6 0 3 
3 3 73 6 77 5 76 50 113 35 104 36 95 18 34 12 28 12 27 
4 11 121 10 110 8 134 63 104 65 108 66 128 38 75 35 80 23 62 
5 13 104 18 110 19 98 72 84 68 80 71 95 67 112 67 123 55 114 
6 18 69 23 81 22 72 73 58 73 56 82 51 94 126 89 109 111 134 
7 35 49 32 49 29 55 54 23 71 33 65 25 103 78 106 88 99 90 
8 24 26 22 34 19 32 44 9 42 14 47 10 77 44 74 35 87 45 
9 42 13 37 12 29 5 28 3 37 7 41 3 46 14 54 23 45 16 
10 37 5 52 2 48 5 36 1 30 2 27 0 30 4 33 5 36 8 
11 41 2 35 2 40 2 18 2 24 0 15 0 13 0 16 2 18 1 
12 50 0 45 0 47 0 11 0 12 1 11 0 5 0 3 1 10 0 
13 59 1 34 0 46 0 6 0 6 1 3 0 2 0 6 0 3 0 
14 46 0 41 0 44 0 1 0 4 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
15 37 0 42 0 36 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
16 27 0 33 0 35 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 18 0 22 0 32 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18 18 0 25 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 13 0 16 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 3 0 5 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 




Table 4.1 Optimal Choice of m and the Average PMSE, Nearly Non-stationary Factor 








 AIC AICC 20 AIC AICC 20 AIC AICC 20 
Avg. # 11.692 4.28 - 11.728 4.156 - 11.452 4.206 - 
Avg. R
2
 0.9123 0.8048 0.9374 0.9305 0.8391 0.9504 0.962 0.9222 0.9728 
Avg. PMSE 6.2022 2.2714 8.4701 3.2219 1.1118 4.1398 0.7399 0.2213 0.935 
T1 = 40 T = 50 
Avg. # 6.358 4.16 - 6.342 4.114 - 6.488 4.214 - 
Avg. R
2
 0.7955 0.7696 0.8378 0.8528 0.8332 0.8827 0.9237 0.9147 0.9393 
Avg. PMSE 1.7769 1.6214 2.1585 0.851 0.7574 1.0292 0.1786 0.156 0.2124 
T1 = 60 T = 70 
Avg. # 5.468 4.308 - 5.432 4.302 - 5.472 4.272 - 
Avg. R
2
 0.77 0.7602 0.8019 0.8239 0.8159 0.8476 0.9139 0.9101 0.9259 
Avg. PMSE 1.3278 1.2805 1.4846 0.6737 0.6517 0.7699 0.1286 0.125 0.1457 
 
Table 4.2 Frequency Distribution of Optimal Number of m, Nearly Non-stationary Factor 




















 A B A B A B A B A B A B A B A B A B 
1 0 25 2 32 3 25 4 22 2 19 6 15 11 17 6 11 8 20 
2 3 73 7 72 7 74 28 75 30 72 22 73 30 55 40 65 24 56 
3 12 99 12 101 5 99 47 99 39 98 41 94 53 101 58 102 75 94 
4 9 106 11 103 16 102 57 105 64 130 52 124 87 113 70 116 75 115 
5 22 78 12 73 24 86 65 84 80 77 76 95 90 100 86 91 87 106 
6 25 41 24 62 31 56 74 63 71 59 72 42 81 58 96 56 79 65 
7 25 39 19 24 19 26 66 32 58 26 67 32 56 30 56 33 68 21 
8 33 23 36 19 33 18 51 13 51 13 51 15 39 20 43 19 32 15 
9 27 8 39 11 31 10 33 5 42 5 38 6 31 6 24 5 26 5 
10 22 6 32 2 44 2 35 2 24 1 37 2 12 0 15 1 14 3 
11 48 1 37 1 33 1 24 0 14 0 14 1 6 0 4 1 7 0 
12 40 1 32 0 34 1 11 0 11 0 8 1 2 0 2 0 3 0 
13 44 0 47 0 36 0 3 0 6 0 12 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
14 40 0 40 0 38 0 1 0 6 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
15 46 0 43 0 40 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 39 0 34 0 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 35 0 28 0 31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18 16 0 17 0 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 11 0 21 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 3 0 7 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A = AIC; B = AICC;  
35 
 
Table 5. Prediction comparison of model with 
N=20, T0=25, T=35, K=1, F~N(0,1), B~N(0,1), kmax=8, σ=1 
 R
2
 PMSE Average number of Regressors 
AIC 0.8246 5.5135 11.092 
AICC 0.6386 2.0310 4.034 
PC1 0.5245 1.5724 7.880 
PC2 0.4992 1.4896 7.012 
PC3 0.5278 1.5799 8 
IC1 0.3346 1.1108 1.356 
IC2 0.3262 1.0767 1.002 
IC3 0.5278 1.5799 8 
 
Table 6. Prediction comparison of model with 
N=20, T0=25, T=35, K=1, F~N(0,1), B~N(0,1), kmax=20, σ=1 
 R
2
 PMSE Average number of Regressors 
AIC 0.8396 5.6705 11.392 
AICC 0.6497 2.0088 4.112 
PC1 0.8882 7.9356 20 
PC2 0.8882 7.9356 20 
PC3 0.8882 7.9356 20 
IC1 0.8882 7.9356 20 
IC2 0.8882 7.9356 20 
IC3 0.8882 7.9356 20 
 
Table 7. Prediction comparison of model with 
N=20, T0=25, T=35, K=5, F~N(0,1), B~N(0,1), kmax=20, σ=1 
 R
2
 PMSE Average number of Regressors 
AIC 0.9349 7.2288 12.1520 
AICC 0.8584 3.3378 5.366 
PC1 0.9527 9.2582 20 
PC2 0.9527 9.2582 20 
PC3 0.9527 9.2582 20 
IC1 0.9527 9.2582 20 
IC2 0.9527 9.2582 20 




Table 8. Prediction comparison of model with 
N=20, T0=25, T=35, K=5, F~N(0,1), B~U(-1,1), kmax=20, σ=1 
 R
2
 PMSE Average number of Regressors 
AIC 0.8820 7.8766 11.98 
AICC 0.7355 2.8996 4.864 
PC1 0.9147 9.9083 20 
PC2 0.9147 9.9083 20 
PC3 0.9147 9.9083 20 
IC1 0.9147 9.9083 20 
IC2 0.9147 9.9083 20 
IC3 0.9147 9.9083 20 
 
Table 9. Prediction comparison of model with 
N=20, T0=25, T=35, K=5, F~N(0,1), B~N(0.3,1), kmax=20, σ=1 
 R
2
 PMSE Average number of Regressors 
AIC 0.9386 8.5870 12.018 
AICC 0.8655 3.0519 5.162 
PC1 0.9549 11.6829 20 
PC2 0.9549 11.6829 20 
PC3 0.9549 11.6829 20 
IC1 0.9549 11.6829 20 
IC2 0.9549 11.6829 20 
IC3 0.9549 11.6829 20 
 
Table 10. Prediction comparison of model with 
N=20, T0=25, T=35, K=5, F~N(0,1), B~N(1,1), kmax=20, σ=1 
 R
2
 PMSE Average number of Regressors 
AIC 0.9590 8.4321 12.296 
AICC 0.9074 3.7535 5.524 
PC1 0.9691 11.1183 20 
PC2 0.9691 11.1183 20 
PC3 0.9691 11.1183 20 
IC1 0.9691 11.1183 20 
IC2 0.9691 11.1183 20 




Table 11. Prediction comparison of model with 
N=20, T0=25, T=35, K=5, F~N(0,1), B~N(2,2), kmax=20, σ=1 
 R
2
 PMSE Average number of Regressors 
AIC 0.9821 9.4982 12.39 
AICC 0.9612 5.0858 6.034 
PC1 0.9865 11.8991 20 
PC2 0.9865 11.8991 20 
PC3 0.9865 11.8991 20 
IC1 0.9865 11.8991 20 
IC2 0.9865 11.8991 20 
IC3 0.9865 11.8991 20 
 
Table 12. Prediction comparison of model with 
N=20, T0=25, T=35, K=5, F~N(0,1), B~N(0,1), kmax=20, σ~U(1,4) 
 R
2
 PMSE Average number of Regressors 
AIC 0.8338 41.4836 11.57 
AICC 0.6382 16.4713 4.466 
PC1 0.8810 55.8442 20 
PC2 0.8810 55.8442 20 
PC3 0.8810 55.8442 20 
IC1 0.8810 55.8442 20 
IC2 0.8810 55.8442 20 
IC3 0.8810 55.8442 20 
 
Table13. Prediction comparison of model with  
N=20, T0=25, T=35, K=5, F~N(0,1), B~N(0,1), kmax=20, ei,t=0.5*eI,t-1+vi,t, σv=1 
 R
2
 PMSE Average number of Regressors 
AIC 0.9445 10.5882 12.188 
AICC 0.8779 4.3454 5.744 
PC1 0.9589 13.8675 20 
PC2 0.9589 13.8675 20 
PC3 0.9589 13.8675 20 
IC1 0.9589 13.8675 20 
IC2 0.9589 13.8675 20 




Table 14. Prediction comparison of model with  
N=20, T0=60, T=70, K=5, F~N(0,1), B~N(1,1), kmax=20, σ=1 
 R
2
 PMSE Average number of Regressors 
AIC 0.8865 1.8256 8.024 
AICC 0.8799 1.8423 6.66 
PC1 0.8986 1.8789 20 
PC2 0.8986 1.8789 20 
PC3 0.8986 1.8789 20 
IC1 0.8986 1.8789 20 
IC2 0.8986 1.8789 20 
IC3 0.8986 1.8789 20 
 
Table 15. Prediction comparison of model with  
N=20, T0=25, T=35, K=5, F~N(0,1), B~N(0,1), kmax=20, σ=5 
 R
2
 PMSE Average number of Regressors 
AIC 0.8510 32.0960 11.77 
AICC 0.6615 13.5590 4.618 
PC1 0.8919 42.9199 20 
PC2 0.8919 42.9199 20 
PC3 0.8919 42.9199 20 
IC1 0.8919 42.9199 20 
IC2 0.8919 42.9199 20 






Table 16. AICC – Weights of Control Groups for the Period 1993Q1 – 1997Q2 
 Beta Std T 
Constant 0.0263 0.017 1.5427 
Japan -0.676 0.1117 -6.0522 
Korea -0.4323 0.0634 -6.8211 
US 0.486 0.2195 2.2141 
Taiwan 0.7926 0.3099 2.5576 
R
2
 = 0.9314; AICC = -171.771 
 
Table 17. AICC – Treatment Effect of Political Integration 1997Q3 – 2003Q4 
 Actual Control Treatment 
Q3-1997 0.061 0.0798 -0.0188 
Q4-1997 0.014 0.081 -0.067 
Q1-1998 -0.032 0.1294 -0.1614 
Q2-1998 -0.061 0.1433 -0.2043 
Q3-1998 -0.081 0.1319 -0.2129 
Q4-1998 -0.065 0.139 -0.204 
Q1-1999 -0.029 0.0876 -0.1166 
Q2-1999 0.005 0.067 -0.062 
Q3-1999 0.039 0.04 -0.001 
Q4-1999 0.083 0.0445 0.0385 
Q1-2000 0.107 0.0434 0.0636 
Q2-2000 0.075 0.0398 0.0352 
Q3-2000 0.076 0.0524 0.0236 
Q4-2000 0.063 0.0318 0.0312 
Q1-2001 0.027 0.0118 0.0152 
Q2-2001 0.015 -0.0177 0.0327 
Q3-2001 -0.001 -0.0177 0.0167 
Q4-2001 -0.017 0.0184 -0.0354 
Q1-2002 -0.01 0.0314 -0.0414 
Q2-2002 0.005 0.05 -0.045 
Q3-2002 0.028 0.0577 -0.0297 
Q4-2002 0.048 0.0346 0.0134 
Q1-2003 0.041 0.0538 -0.0128 
Q2-2003 -0.009 0.0251 -0.0341 
Q3-2003 0.038 0.0628 -0.0248 
Q4-2003 0.047 0.0761 -0.0291 
MEAN 0.018 0.0576 -0.0396 
STD 0.0478 0.0429 0.0787 
T 0.3761 1.3417 -0.5034 
40 
 
Table 18. AIC – Weights of Control Groups for the Period 1993Q1 – 1997Q2 
 Beta Std T 
Constant 0.0316 0.0164 1.9283 
Japan -0.69 0.1056 -6.5341 
Korea -0.3767 0.0688 -5.4721 
US 0.8099 0.2873 2.8193 
Philippines  -0.1624 0.0999 -1.6248 
Taiwan 0.6189 0.311 1.9902 
R
2
 = 0.9438; AIC  = -180.986 
 
Table 19. AIC – Treatment Effect of Political Integration 1997Q3 – 2003Q4 
 Actual Control Treatment 
Q3-1997 0.061 0.0839 -0.0229 
Q4-1997 0.014 0.0811 -0.0671 
Q1-1998 -0.032 0.1344 -0.1664 
Q2-1998 -0.061 0.1438 -0.2048 
Q3-1998 -0.081 0.1334 -0.2144 
Q4-1998 -0.065 0.1472 -0.2122 
Q1-1999 -0.029 0.0952 -0.1242 
Q2-1999 0.005 0.0704 -0.0654 
Q3-1999 0.039 0.0464 -0.0074 
Q4-1999 0.083 0.0473 0.0357 
Q1-2000 0.107 0.031 0.076 
Q2-2000 0.075 0.0344 0.0406 
Q3-2000 0.076 0.0394 0.0366 
Q4-2000 0.063 0.0208 0.0422 
Q1-2001 0.027 0.0155 0.0115 
Q2-2001 0.015 -0.0101 0.0251 
Q3-2001 -0.001 -0.0071 0.0061 
Q4-2001 -0.017 0.0251 -0.0421 
Q1-2002 -0.01 0.0375 -0.0475 
Q2-2002 0.005 0.0473 -0.0423 
Q3-2002 0.028 0.0593 -0.0313 
Q4-2002 0.048 0.027 0.021 
Q1-2003 0.041 0.0463 -0.0053 
Q2-2003 -0.009 0.0302 -0.0392 
Q3-2003 0.038 0.0593 -0.0213 
Q4-2003 0.047 0.077 -0.03 
MEAN 0.018 0.0583 -0.0403 
STD 0.0478 0.0435 0.0815 
T 0.3761 1.3393 -0.4953 
41 
 
Table 20. AICC – Weights of Control Groups for the Period 1993Q1 – 2003Q4 
 Beta Std T 
Constant -0.0019 0.0037 -0.524 
Austria -1.0116 0.1682 -6.0128 
Italy -0.3177 0.1591 -1.9971 
Korea 0.3447 0.0469 7.3506 
Mexico 0.3129 0.051 6.1335 
Norway 0.3222 0.0538 5.9912 
Singapore 0.1845 0.0546 3.3812 
R
2
 = 0.931    
AICC  = -378.9427    
 
Table 21. AICC – Treatment Effect for Economic Integration 2004Q1 – 2008Q1 
 Actual Control Treatment 
Q1-2004 0.077 0.0493 0.0277 
Q2-2004 0.12 0.0686 0.0514 
Q3-2004 0.066 0.0515 0.0145 
Q4-2004 0.079 0.0446 0.0344 
Q1-2005 0.062 0.0217 0.0403 
Q2-2005 0.071 0.0177 0.0533 
Q3-2005 0.081 0.0333 0.0477 
Q4-2005 0.069 0.029 0.04 
Q1-2006 0.09 0.0471 0.0429 
Q2-2006 0.062 0.0417 0.0203 
Q3-2006 0.064 0.025 0.039 
Q4-2006 0.066 0.0009 0.0651 
Q1-2007 0.055 -0.0101 0.0651 
Q2-2007 0.062 0.0092 0.0528 
Q3-2007 0.068 0.0143 0.0537 
Q4-2007 0.069 0.0508 0.0182 
Q1-2008 0.073 0.0538 0.0192 
MEAN 0.0726 0.0323 0.0403 
STD 0.0149 0.0213 0.016 




Table 22. AIC – Weights of Control Groups for the Period 1993Q1 – 2003Q4 
 Beta Std T 
Constant -0.003 0.0042 -0.7095 
Austria -1.2949 0.2181 -5.9361 
Germany 0.3552 0.233 1.5243 
Italy -0.5768 0.1781 -3.2394 
Korea 0.3016 0.0587 5.1342 
Mexico 0.234 0.0609 3.8395 
Norway 0.2881 0.0562 5.1304 
Switzerland 0.2436 0.1729 1.4092 
Singapore 0.2222 0.0553 4.0155 
Philippines 0.1757 0.1089 1.6127 
R
2
 = 0.9433    
AIC = -385.7498    
 
Table 23. AIC – Treatment Effect for Economic Integration 2004Q1 – 2008Q1 
 Actual Control Treatment 
Q1-2004 0.077 0.0559 0.0211 
Q2-2004 0.12 0.0722 0.0478 
Q3-2004 0.066 0.0446 0.0214 
Q4-2004 0.079 0.0314 0.0476 
Q1-2005 0.062 0.0121 0.0499 
Q2-2005 0.071 0.0126 0.0584 
Q3-2005 0.081 0.0314 0.0496 
Q4-2005 0.069 0.0278 0.0412 
Q1-2006 0.09 0.0436 0.0464 
Q2-2006 0.062 0.0372 0.0248 
Q3-2006 0.064 0.0292 0.0348 
Q4-2006 0.066 0.0122 0.0538 
Q1-2007 0.055 0.0051 0.0499 
Q2-2007 0.062 0.0279 0.0341 
Q3-2007 0.068 0.0255 0.0425 
Q4-2007 0.069 0.0589 0.0101 
Q1-2008 0.073 0.062 0.011 
MEAN 0.0726 0.0347 0.0379 
STD 0.0149 0.0193 0.0151 





Figure 1. AICC – Actual and Predicted Real 
GDP from 1993Q1 to 1997Q2
 
Figure 4. AIC – Actual and Predicted Real 
GDP from 1993Q1 to 1997Q2
 
Figure 2. AICC –Actual and Counterfactual 
Real GDP from 1997Q3 to 2003Q4
 
Figure 5. AIC – Actual and Counterfactual 
Real GDP from 1997Q3 to 2003Q4
 
Figure 3. AICC – Autocorrelation of 
Treatment Effect from 1997Q3 to 2003Q4 
 
Figure 6. AIC – Autocorrelation of 






Figure 7. AICC – Actual and Predicted 
Real GDP from 1993Q1 to 2003Q4
 
Figure 10. AIC – Actual and Predicted Real 
GDP from 1993Q1 to 2003Q4
 
Figure 8. AICC – Actual and Counterfactual 
Real GDP from 2004Q1 to 2008Q1 
 
 
Figure 11. AIC – Actual and Counterfactual 
Real GDP from 2004Q1 to 2008Q1 
 
Figure 9. AICC – Autocorrelation of 
Treatment Effect from 2004Q1 to 2008Q1
 
Figure 12. AIC – Autocorrelation of 





Figure B.1 Predicted Counterfactual for Political Integration from 93Q1 to 97Q2





Figure B.3 Counterfactual for Economic Integration using Approximate Factor Model














Actual Predicted Treatment   Actual Predicted Treatment 
97Q3 0.061 0.2526 -0.1916  04Q1 0.077 0.0584 0.0186 
97Q4 0.014 0.453 -0.439  04Q2 0.12 0.0755 0.0445 
98Q1 -0.032 -1.7748 1.7428  04Q3 0.066 0.0545 0.0115 
98Q2 -0.061 -0.8151 0.7541  04Q4 0.079 0.0432 0.0358 
98Q3 -0.081 -0.4678 0.3868  05Q1 0.062 0.0132 0.0488 
98Q4 -0.065 -1.1164 1.0514  05Q2 0.071 0.0072 0.0638 
99Q1 -0.029 1.4224 -1.4514  05Q3 0.081 0.0248 0.0562 
99Q2 0.005 0.1434 -0.1384  05Q4 0.069 0.0272 0.0418 
99Q3 0.039 1.2769 -1.2379  06Q1 0.09 0.0476 0.0424 
99Q4 0.083 1.5864 -1.5034  06Q2 0.062 0.0401 0.0219 
00Q1 0.107 0.224 -0.117  06Q3 0.064 0.0258 0.0382 
00Q2 0.075 1.0059 -0.9309  06Q4 0.066 0.0174 0.0486 
00Q3 0.076 -1.3426 1.4186  07Q1 0.055 0.013 0.042 
00Q4 0.063 -3.3762 3.4392  07Q2 0.062 0.0032 0.0588 
01Q1 0.027 -2.5358 2.5628  07Q3 0.068 0.0022 0.0658 
01Q2 0.015 -2.7242 2.7392  07Q4 0.069 0.0205 0.0485 
01Q3 -0.001 -1.2293 1.2283  08Q1 0.073 0.017 0.056 
01Q4 -0.017 -0.8478 0.8308  MEAN 0.0726 0.0289 0.0437 
02Q1 -0.01 -0.7321 0.7221  STD 0.0149 0.0211 0.0153 
02Q2 0.005 -0.4256 0.4306      
02Q3 0.028 -1.5934 1.6214      
02Q4 0.048 0.5178 -0.4698      
03Q1 0.041 -0.5959 0.6369      
03Q2 -0.009 0.357 -0.366      
03Q3 0.038 0.5072 -0.4692      
03Q4 0.047 0.0609 -0.0139      
MEAN 0.018 -0.4527 0.4706      
STD 0.0478 1.281 1.2737      
 
                                                             
1
 IC1 gives =kmax=20. 
